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world. I am aware that this is a controversial call in an age in which 
the social sciences—echoing the phenomenal incoherence, the sheer 
complexity, of the contemporary order of things, its tendency toward 
the anti-systemic, the contingent, rupture, and disorder—have tended 
to turn their back on theory. And to seek succor in ever more exquisite 
forms of neo-empiricism; in anthropology, my own discipline, this has 
been accompanied by a return to the search for pristine, de-historicized 
cultures, now rebranded as the “ontological turn,” which we wisely 
gave up on some decades ago. But to give up on “doing theory” in this 
way, to su!ce ourselves by merely describing the world as we and/
or our “natives” see it, is to give up on the essential gesture of critical 
social knowledge: namely, to account for the connections between the 
visible and the invisible, to plumb the forces that lie unseen behind the 
tumult, the cacophony, the contingent in the phenomenology of our 
everyday lives, forces that make that world at once inequitable, violent, 
and catastrophe-prone, at once obscenely rich in its benevolence and 
punishingly poor in withholding its bounty, at once progressive and 
retrogressive, at once remarkably stable and wildly labile. It is to this 
endeavor that !eory from the South sought, modestly, to join itself.
Liberal Revolutions and the African Future 
An Interview with Keith Hart
Economic anthropologist Keith Hart (KH), one of the leading "gures in 
African studies, spoke to Social Transformations editor Lisandro Claudio 
(LC) to discuss the future of African regionalism. Hart, a Centennial 
Professor of Economic Anthropology at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, has recently co-edited with John Sharp the volume, 
People, Money and Power in the Economic Crisis: Perspectives from 
the Global South (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014). !e interview took 
place in Copenhagen in November 2014.
LC: So let’s start with the "rst question I ask anyone I interview for 
the journal: What is the Global South for you? 
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KH: Not the North, that’s all really. Having lived as long as I have, I 
have seen transformations in these terminologies. !e South is Latin 
America as seen from North America and Africa as seen from Europe; 
but the whole of Asia doesn’t "t into that directional logic. Asia has made 
a successful transition from colonialism to national capitalism, which 
is not the case for most of Africa. It’s quite a problematic terminology 
but I’m happy to use it. Obviously if I’m sitting inside Africa I have 
no problem saying I’m in the South. I have a book coming out (edited 
with John Sharp for Berghahn Books), People, Money and Power in the 
Economic Crisis: Perspectives from the Global South. I’m willing to use it, 
but I don’t really want to put much e#ort into de"ning it.  
LC: So why do you still use it even if you think it’s problematic?
KH: In terms of the research program that I organize (the Human 
Economy Program at the University of Pretoria, South Africa), it is 
very clear who is from the North and who is not. You know that post-
Cold War Europe and North America are on a very di#erent trajectory 
than for example people from Southern Africa. And the idea of the 
South reminds us to take account of that di#erence.
LC: Were you more comfortable with the term “!ird World” before?
KH: Yes I was, because it was the Cold War blocs—America and its 
allies, the USSR and its allies—and the rest. I thought that it described 
well the whole non-aligned movement from Bandung and the rest of 
it. You knew what we were talking about at that time—Asia, Latin 
America, or Africa. No problem with it.
LC: So if the Global South is not as useful, what happens after the 
!ird World? What’s heir to that term that represents a politics useful 
for global solidarity?
KH: Obviously we’re forced to use the South because there is no 
alternative. I’m not that much against it; it is just that I have never 
given much thought to de"ning it because it obscures the growing 
di#erence between Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
LC: Let’s talk about Africa then, because it is where you specialize. 
You argue in your work that Africa is in a critical conjuncture now. 
20 Social Transformations Vol. 3, No. 1, Mar. 2015
And you are making provocative predictions about Africa’s future. So 
what will happen to Africa in the future?
KH: !e main thing that will happen to Africa is that its population 
will go through a gigantic explosion in the remaining decades of 
this century. Secondly, it seems to me inevitable that the purchasing 
power of Africans will increase. And so I think Asian manufacturers 
understand that in the twenty-"rst century, Africa is going to be 
essential to growth in the world market. 
LC: And what are the implications of that going to be with respect to 
Western capital? 
KH: !e fact is that Western capital is complacent and rather detached 
from what is going on in Africa. !ey seem to be kind of locked into a 
model of mining and extraction.
LC: So are investments in the future of Africa going to be basically the 
West competing with China or is it more complex?
KH: I think the chief competitors are the United States and China, 
and secondarily Europe. !e United States formed its "rst United 
Africa Command a few years ago and they de"ned it as operating 
from the Sahara desert in Algeria as far as Somalia. If you look at that 
line, it is designed to keep the Europeans out. And, to some extent, 
to resist the Chinese incursions too. At the moment, the imperialist 
powers most active in Africa are the Americans, the French, and the 
Chinese.
LC: How would you distinguish between these three imperialisms?
KH: America’s is based on military preponderance. !e United 
States has a very serious reactionary commitment. !e French and 
the Americans have been involved in reactionary coups in Central 
African Republic and Mali. It was never widely understood that the 
Americans pulled o# an amazing coup in substituting Kabila for 
Mobutu, basically handing over the Eastern Congo to Rwanda and 
Ugandan generals organized by Museveni and Kagame.
!e Americans were ever really held responsible for that. It was an 
alliance between them and the South Africans. Mugabe was the gun-
21Conversations on the Global South
runner to Kabila in Katanga, and Museveni launched his Rwandan 
generals. !e nature of this alliance never got the publicity that it 
deserved. Of course the French were deeply put out because they lost 
heavily in Rwanda. It even became an English-speaking country.
And for a time the French got involved with the Nigerians who 
also felt that they had a legitimate strategic interest in the Congo. 
But now the French have jumped into bed with the Americans. !at 
particular alliance is no longer so important.
!e strategic future of Africa lies in the Congo, which is not just a 
mineral rich place. !e fact is that the Congo was a developed society 
in the nineteenth century. Even during Belgian colonialism, there were 
more engineers in the Congo than anywhere else in Africa. !ey are a 
well-educated people. South Africa obviously has a direct interest in 
the Congo, and I do think the future will be fought over the Congo. It 
is still a very large country as well.
LC: Can you speak a little bit about Western anxieties in Africa 
relative to China now?
KH: I don’t know who’s anxious. In many countries of Southern Africa, 
governments have found it easier to deal with Chinese traders than to 
develop their own businessmen. !at is for several reasons, including 
the fact that they can rip o" foreigners more easily. But also if they 
develop a business class, an indigenous business class, these people 
become potential supporters of political opponents.  
Governments are extremely comfortable about inviting Chinese 
participation in their economies, but there are lots of local interest 
groups involved, most especially the indigenous business classes. 
LC: I want to move on to a discussion of revolutions. Earlier (before 
the interview) you told me you were thinking about revolutionary 
prospects in Africa. Can you explain? 
KH: I believe that Africa can only develop if it gets rid of its existing 
national political systems. !at is not to say it will or must, but the vast 
majority of ordinary Africans su"er unnecessarily from the restrictions 
imposed on them by these regimes. I have looked at revolution in some 
classical European-North American examples. !e point is that, in 
many places, the revolution only came after a prolonged period of 
trying to establish new economic connections. So, for example, in 
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Germany, in 1818, they founded a customs union (Zollverein), and 
made a few Hohenzollern dependencies to join. Over the next !fty 
years they added groups of people, who sometimes left because they 
thought the arrangement was unfair. But the project of a national 
economy was developed and identi!ed as such. At the end of it all 
they created the German empire. 
"e timing and sequence was very similar with the European 
common market after the Second World War, which began with just 
half a dozen countries in the 1950s. By the end of the century, it was 
a fully-#edged political union of most European countries. "at kind 
of free-trade movement for the home market will involve participation 
from di$erent African groups in highly selective ways. But a kind of 
war will develop between the two main sides—those that seek to 
maintain traditional imperialist ties and national state structures, and 
others who seek to replace these with more inclusive associations 
based on trade.
LC: Who do you think these people are going to be in the case of 
Africa? 
KH: Imported Chinese cars are very expensive because of the costs of 
transport and political harassment after they have arrived in Africa. 
If the Chinese are as powerful as they are and if they’re aiming at 
expanding the African market for their goods, they have a direct 
interest in overriding these impediments to internal trade. "erefore, 
if the Chinese turned against this kind of national political class and 
its more traditional supporters in Western foreign capital, that would 
lead in the end to a kind of war. Similarly, the German Zollverein 
was designed essentially to unite Germans against Austria and keep 
Austria out. Even though there were not signi!cant wars between 
German states in this period, there were wars between coalitions of 
German states and the Austrians at various times. 
My aim is not to predict who the parties will be, but my 
fundamental bet is that a large number of Africans and some of their 
foreign supporters will want less harassment and more freedom of 
movement over an expanded area and with fewer political impositions 
on their activities.
LC: What is going to be the role of liberalism in all this? 
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KH: In Africa and any other region that is subjected to a kind of pre-
capitalist regime, the principal interest of the most number of people is 
to increase their own freedom of movement and freedom of property. 
!at is the classical purpose of a liberal revolution. 
LC: But isn’t there a danger in using the liberal revolutions of Europe 
to predict this? 
KH: You tell me how many liberal revolutions have already taken 
place in history and where they can be found. !ere have been liberal 
revolutions in Latin America, Bolivar around the 1820s. I have lived for 
eighteen years in France and ten years in America. I’m very interested 
in these countries and have read a lot about their history. It is not that 
they o"er a blueprint for it, but they o"er much food for thought that 
contradicts prevailing orthodoxy. I can give you an example.  
I wrote a piece for a French leftwing book called Is there an 
Emancipatory Project for the 21st Century? !ey asked me to write 
something about Africa. So I wrote a piece and they said, “We really 
like it, Keith, but we don’t understand how you can have free trade and 
protection.” I pointed out that when all these countries and regions got 
their act together, they wanted to expand and consolidate the home 
market and to o"er some degree of protection for improved economic 
access in the world economy. 
Ha-Joon Chang, a Korean economist from Cambridge, wrote a 
book called 23 !ings You Never Knew About Capitalism, arguing that 
the experience of the Southeast Asian tigers was basically building their 
development around protection of home industry. Industrialization is 
a model that can be exported to regions like Africa today. While my 
examples are from early in nineteenth-century Europe rather than 
1950s Asia, it does not really change the usefulness of being able to 
think through these historical cases. 
LC: Let us talk further about developmentalism in Africa and the 
possibility of the Asian developmental model being transposed there.
KH: !e aim of the developmental state in the post-war period would 
be to create the largest possible free trade area within Africa itself or 
several of them and to impose protection barriers around them. Based 
on the examples that I am aware of, the size of this free trade area 
would be expanded over time or it could shrink or whatever.
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!e whole point about liberal free trade development is reducing 
restrictions on movement within a given area and harmonizing 
tari"s and regulations to improve the possibility of internal trade and 
movement. But along with this, the cold winds of the world market 
have to be held at arm’s length at least for some period before they can 
be selectively relaxed. 
LC: !is raises the question of the political form that would organize 
such a free trade area. What we have at the moment is a number of 
free trade areas without a political form. !e European Union is one 
exception to that, but others like Mercosur and NAFTA do not have 
strong political rules behind them. 
KH: I don’t know if you’ve heard of a French agricultural activist 
called Jose Bove. He runs a coalition of small farmers and urban 
environmentalists and consumers. Jose Bove was asked by somebody, 
“Aren’t you worried about these eastern European farmers coming and 
the cutting the prices available to your French farmers?” He replied, 
“!e big problem is corporate-driven global free trade.” He went on, 
“I want the largest regional associations possible. I want the largest 
European association so that we can resist the ability of corporations 
to dictate global prices. I’m happy to help the Africans or Latin 
Americans to develop similar things.”
What we cannot anticipate is the political forms that would 
accompany this attempt to consolidate and protect home markets. !e 
point about the post-War period is that for thirty years, everywhere in 
the world—whether they were Stalinist state socialism, Western-style 
industrial welfare states, or postcolonial states—they all took the same 
form.
LC: Namely?
KH: Developmental states. I’m interested in opening up a debate on 
how people imagine political possibilities. Ha-Joon Chang’s Korean 
model is rather restrictive and there are many people in Africa who 
would say, “We have to follow the Koreans or the Chinese in order to 
develop a more politically centralized system.” 
Development is more piecemeal and complex than that. When I 
talk about an African trade union or whatever, many Africans assume 
that I mean the African Union, all the heads of government meeting 
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and signing pieces of paper. But the vision of history that I have is of 
something much more dirty, messy, and piecemeal, with a few people 
coming together, !ghting each other, breaking up, disappearing, and 
so on.
LC: Any piecemeal history will of course include grassroots social 
movements. 
KH: De!nitely.
LC: What kind of movements do you see supporting or advocating 
the kind of Africa that you envision?
KH: "e formal structures of political power and many of informal 
applications within them and across nation-state boundaries are 
extremely onerous for people. I mean, Southern Africa has three out 
of the !ve most costly monetary transfers between two countries in the 
world—led by South Africa and Zambia.
I know someone from Zimbabwe who couldn’t transfer money 
between South Africa and home. His family had returned from 
London and he had to get money to them. He ended up having to 
give cash to mini bus drivers—with a considerable risk of nobody 
ever seeing the money again. Also, the example of M-Pesa in Kenya, 
mobile phone money, has alleviated the burden of everyday life for so 
many Kenyans just by allowing them to make money transfers through 
mobile phones. No other form of digital transfer has a direct payment 
system built in. "e Internet doesn’t, for example. With phones, they 
get an instant acknowledgement of the transfer. 
Imagine what it is now like. In parts of Kenya, a peasant may have 
to go !fty kilometers to pay his annual taxes, local taxes. He may be 
kept waiting for two days by some bureaucrat who simply wants to 
make his life di#cult. "at guy can now transfer the cash without 
leaving his home and in ways that are extremely reliable.
I am not suggesting necessarily that the vehicles for this kind of 
enhanced liberalism will take the form of social movements, but once 
people realize that there are ways of living in this world that do not 
involve the kind of shit they once had to put up with, really, they will 
take it.
LC: So this is an optimistic account.
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KH: It is not optimistic in the sense of predicting what will happen. I 
want to write something that will show people how they could have a 
di!erent future than the one they think is inevitable.
LC: So it’s normative? 
KH: Certainly normative. What I’m claiming, if you like, is that 
movement is a human right; it is a universal human right and 
movement around the planet should not be controlled by territorial 
states who have the right to shake us down whenever they feel like or 
to decide whether we can move or not into their territory.
All of this adds up for me to a Kantian cosmopolitan idea. I 
envisage a new free trade movement at a global level which says, “We 
have to do something about these territorial states which are making it 
di"cult for us to move.” And a place like Africa could easily be in the 
vanguard of such a movement. 
